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Abstract
The uncertainty of expectations and vagueness of the interests belong to
natural components of cooperative situations, in general. Therefore, some
kind of formalization of uncertainty and vagueness should be included in
realistic models of cooperative behaviour. This paper attempts to contribute
to the endeavour of designing a universal model of vagueness in cooperative
situations. Namely, some initial auxiliary steps toward the development of
such a model are described. We use the concept of fuzzy coalitions suggested
in [1], discuss the concepts of superadditivity and convexity, and introduce a
concept of the coalitional structure of fuzzy coalitions.
The first version of this paper [10] was presented at the Czech-Japan
Seminar in Valtice 2003. It was obvious that the roots of some open questions
can be found in the concept of superadditivity (with consequences on some
other related concepts), which deserve more attention. This version of the
paper extends the previous one by discussion of alternative approaches to
this topic.
1 Introduction
The classical mathematical model of cooperative behaviour, based on the concept
of coalitional game, is deterministic. In this paper, we focus our attention on
the transferable utility (TU) coalitional games (see, e. g., [9]). These games are
characterized by a (non-empty and finite) set of players, which generates the class
of admissible coalitions, and by total coalitional payoffs determining the common
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income of each coalition. Since knowledge of both these components (coalitions
and payoffs) is often only vague, a fuzzification of the original deterministic model
appears desirable.
Two main approaches to the fuzzification of TU games can be found in the
literature. Some authors deal with the fuzzification of coalitions. This approach is
based on the idea that each player can participate in more than one coalition. The
participation in particular coalitions can be of different degree, which influences
also the distribution of coalitional payoff. This uncertainty is formally included
into the model by fuzzification of coalitions – each coalition is a fuzzy subset of the
set of all players, as shown, e. g., in [1, 2, 3] and also in [8]. The alternative approach
to the fuzzification of TU games is concerned with the expected coalitional payoffs.
This type of uncertainty can be represented by considering fuzzy payoffs (i.e., fuzzy
numbers) instead of the traditional crisp characteristic function of the game. This
model is described, e. g., in [4, 5, 7]. As the direct substitution of crisp payoffs by
fuzzy values leads to some formal difficulties, as shown, e. g., in [4], it appears to
be more adequate to transform this model into an alternative one where a fuzzy
class of deterministic games is investigated instead of the fuzzy games (with fuzzy
payoffs). In [6] and [7], we have shown that it is possible.
The presumed further research of fuzzy coalitional games could be oriented to
the construction of a unitary model of uncertainty in cooperation including both
of the sources of vagueness mentioned above. Recently, it has appeared useful to
design theoretical tools for its development, among which the tools for handling
coalitional structures, their fuzzy counterparts and their relevant properties play a
significant role. In this contribution, we propose a concept of the fuzzy coalitional
structure based on the model of fuzzy coalition from [1], and discuss the fuzzy
analogies of superadditivity and convexity.
2 Crisp TU Coalitional Games
In the classical coalitional game theory (see e. g., [9] or introductory parts of [4])
the game with transferable utility (TU game) is defined as a pair (I, v) composed
by the set of players I which is assumed to be non-empty and finite (without loss
of generality we “name” the players by natural numbers and set I = {1, 2, . . . , n}),
and by the characteristic function v. If we call every set of playersK ⊂ I, including
K = I and the empty set K = ∅, a coalition, then the characteristic function v
associates with every coalition K a real number v(K) which represents the common
expected payoff of coalition K. We suppose that v(∅) = 0. If, for each pair of
disjoint coalitions K, K ′ ⊂ I,
v(K ∪K ′) = v(K) + v(K ′) (1)
then we say that the game is superadditive. If, for each K, K ′ ⊂ I,
v(K ∪K ′) + v(K ∩K ′) = v(K) + v(K ′) (2)
then the game is called convex. Every partition of I into disjoint coalitions, let us
denote it K = {K1, . . . ,Km},Ki ∩Kj = ∅ for i 6= j,K1 ∪ . . . ∪Km = I, is called a
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coalitional structure.
3 Fuzzy Coalitions
In what follows, the set of all subsets of a set X is denoted by P(X). For a subset
of the set P(I) of all players, that is, for a crisp coalition from P(I), we often use
the letter K, possibly with subscripts or superscripts.
Let us now turn our attention to the fuzzification of coalitions. First we notice
that each crisp coalition K can be identified with the vector
(τK(1), τK(2), . . . , τK(n)) , (3)
where, for every player i ∈ I, τK(i) = 1 iff i ∈ K and τK(i) = 0 iff i ∈ I \K.
If we accept the assumption that the players participate in coalitions only with
some part of their “power”, then we also accept that some players can participate
in more than one coalition. Such “partial” participation can be formalized by
means of the fuzzy set theoretical tools (see [1, 2, 3]). Following Aubin [1], we
define a fuzzy coalition L as a fuzzy subset of I with membership function τL :
I → [0, 1], where the value τL(i) ∈ [0, 1] represents the degree in which player i ∈ I
participates in fuzzy coalition L. The class of all fuzzy coalitions in the game (I, v)
is denoted by F(I) and we denote the fuzzy coalitions by (possibly with subscripts
or superscripts) letters L orM . Evidently, every fuzzy coalition L can be identified
with the n-dimensional vector
τL = (τL(1), τL(2), . . . , τL(n)) , τL(i) ∈ [0, 1], i = 1, 2, . . . , n. (4)
It is natural to expect that fuzzy and crisp coalitions are somewhat mutually re-
lated. It turns out that the fuzzy coalitions may be considered as combinations
of the cooperative endeavour of deterministic sets of players. Let us make this
informal claim more precise.
If L1, L2, . . . , Lm are fuzzy coalitions represented by vectors
(τL1(1), . . . , τL1(n)) , (τL2(1), . . . , τL2(n)) , . . . , (τLm(1), . . . , τLm(n))
and λ1, λ2, . . . , λm ∈ [0, 1] are real coefficients, then the real-valued vector
(λ1τL1(1) + λ2τL2(1) + . . .+ λmτLm(1), . . . , λ1τL1(n) + λ2τL2(n) + . . .+ λmτLm(n))
(5)
is called a combination of coalitions L1, L2, . . . , Lm. In abbreviatory form, we write
λ1L1 + λ2L2 + . . . + λmLm. If, moreover, λ1 + λ2 + . . . + λm 5 1 then vector (5)
is called a subconvex combination of L1, L2, . . . , Lm, and if the sum is equal to 1
then vector (5) is called a convex combination of L1, L2, . . . , Lm.
The crisp coalitions deserve a special attention. Obviously, they can be con-
sidered to be special cases of fuzzy coalitions. Namely, they can be identified with
those fuzzy coalitions whose membership functions may take only values 0 or 1.
The n players of the game can form 2n crisp coalitions. To simplify the formulations
of some statements, we set N = 2n − 1.
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Obviously each fuzzy coalition L characterized by vector τL can be expressed
as a combination of crisp coalitions. For example, setting λ1 = τL(1), λ2 =
τL(2), . . . , λn = τL(n), we obtain coalition L as combination of crisp one-player
coalitions {1}, {2}, . . . , {n}. Such a combination may be neither subconvex nor
convex combination. In what follows, we are interested in the representation of
fuzzy coalitions by means of subconvex combination or convex combinations of
some crisp coalitions.
Observation 1. Every fuzzy coalition can be represented by a convex combination
of crisp coalitions.
Proof. This is a direct consequence of the fact that every nonempty convex compact
set in a finite dimensional space is a convex combination of its extreme points. Here
the fuzzy coalitions are represented by points of the unit hypercube [0, 1]n, and the
crisp coalitions are represented by the vertices of that hypercube. 
The following example shows that a fuzzy coalition can be represented by more
than one convex combinations of crisp coalitions.
Example 1. Let us consider a three-players set I = {1, 2, 3} and its fuzzy coali-
tion L represented by the triple (τL(1), τL(2), τL(3)), where τL(1) = 13 , τL(2) =
1, τL(3) = 13 . Then it can be represented either by a pair of crisp coalitions (I,K).
τI(1) = τI(2) = τI(3) = 1 and λI = 13 ;K = {2}, i. e., τK(1) = τK(3) = 0, τK(2) = 1
and λK = 23 . Or, it can be represented by a triple of crisp coalitions K1,K2,K3 ∈P(I), where K1 = {1, 2}, K2 = {2, 3}, K3 = {2}, i. e.
τK1(1) = τK1(2) = 1, τK1(3) = 0; τK2(1) = 0, τK2(2) = τK2(3) = 1;
τK3(1) = τK3(3) = 0, τK3(2) = 1,
and λK1 = λK2 = λK3 =
1
3 . 
Let us note that each fuzzy coalition L from P(I), can be expressed as a
convex combination of all crisp coalitions K0,K1, . . . ,KN , i. e., L = λ0K0 +
λ1K1 + · · · + λNKN , where we denote K0 = ∅ and where some of the coeffi-
cients λj , j = 0, . . . , N = 2n − 1, may vanish. It follows that L can be represented
by an (N +1)-dimensional vector (λ0, λ1, . . . , λN ) whose components sum up to 1.
Vice-versa, each convex combination of all crisp coalitions represents some fuzzy
coalition. In other words, each non-negative vector (λ0, λ1, . . . , λN ) whose compo-
nents sum up to 1 represents certain fuzzy coalition. It follows from the previous
example that the mapping between fuzzy coalitions and vectors (λj)j=0,...,N is not
one-to-one.
If, again following Aubin, we define a cooperative fuzzy game with transferable
utility as a function w that assigns to every fuzzy coalition L a real number w(L)
such that to the empty fuzzy coalition is assigned 0, then it is natural to ask which
of such fuzzy games can be considered as extensions of crisp games. It is rational
to require that the payoffs to fuzzy coalitions of such extensions are related in some
specific way to the payoffs of the corresponding crisp coalitions.
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If a fuzzy coalition L is represented by a subconvex combination of crisp coali-
tions K1,K2, . . . ,Km with coefficients λ1, λ2, . . . , λm, then it is natural to consider
the analogous subconvex combination of the payoffs
λ1v(K1) + λ2v(K2) + . . .+ λmv(Km). (6)
As there may exist several representations of a fuzzy coalition, we define the value
v¯(L) for any fuzzy coalition L by
v¯(L) = sup
(
λ1v(K1) + λ2v(K2) . . .+ λmv(Km)
)
(7)
where the supremum is taken over all subconvex combinations λ1v(K1)+λ2v(K2)+
. . .+ λmv(Km) representing L.
We already know that each fuzzy coalition L can be identified with a vector
(λ0, λ1, . . .
. . . , λN ) ∈ [0, 1]N such that L = λ0K0 + . . . + λNKN is a convex combination
of all crisp coalitions. The following Observation 2 shows that the class of all sub-
convex combination in (7) can be reduced to the class of convex combinations of
all crisp coalitions.
Observation 2. For every fuzzy coalition L,
v¯(L) = sup
(
λ0v(K1) + λ1v(K2) + · · ·+ λNv(KN )
)
where the supremum is taken over all convex combinations λ0K0+ · · ·+λNKN (of
all crisp coalitions) representing L.
Proof. Let vˆ(L) denote the supremum in the equality to be proved. Since every
convex combination is also a subconvex combination, we have vˆ(L) ≤ v¯(L). Let us
assume that vˆ(L) < v¯(L). Then there is a subconvex combination
λ1K1 + · · ·+ λmKm
(of crisp coalitions) representing L such that
λ1 + . . .+ λm < 1
λ1v(K1) + λ2v(K2) + · · ·+ λmv(Km) > vˆ(L).
By setting
λ0 = 1− λ1 + . . .+ λm and λj = 0 for j 6∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m},
we obtain a convex combination λ0K0 + λ1K1 + · · · + λNKN representing L and
such that
λ0v(K0) + λ1v(K1) + · · ·+ λNv(KN ) > vˆ(L),
which is in contradiction with the definition of vˆ(L). 
In this way we have associated with every crisp game v exactly one fuzzy game
w, namely w = v¯.
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Observation 3. If v is the characteristic function of a deterministic TU game,
then v¯(K) = v(K) for every crisp coalition K.
Proof. Let K be a crisp coalition. Since K can be represented by the convex
combination with m = 1, λ1 = 1, K1 = K, we have v¯(K) ≥ v(K). Now suppose
that v¯(K) > v(K). Then there is a subconvex combination λ1K1+ · · ·+ λmKm of
crisp coalitions such that
λ1v(K1) + · · ·+ λmv(Km) > v(K). (8)
There is no loss of generality in assuming that all coefficient λj , j = 1, 2, . . . ,m,
are positive. It follows that Kj = K for each j = 1, 2, . . . ,m. Indeed, if player i
does not belong to coalition K, then
λ1τK1(i) + · · ·+ λmτKm(i) = 0, (9)
which is possible only if τKj (i) = 0 for each j = 1, 2, . . . ,m. Now suppose that
i ∈ K and i /∈ Kj for some j. Let J be the set of all indices j for which i /∈ Kj .
Then we have ∑
j∈J
λjτKj (i) +
∑
j /∈J
λjτKj (i) = 1,
which can be satisfied only if J is empty. To complete the proof, we note that, for
K1 = K2 = · · · = Km = K, we have
λ1v(K1) + · · ·+ λmv(Km) = (λ1 + · · ·+ λm) v(K) ≤ v(K),
which contradicts (8). 
4 Convexity and Superadditivity
In this section we denote byM, L the fuzzy coalitionsM = (τM (1), . . . , τM (n)), L =
(τL(1), . . . , τL(n)) and, in accordance with the principles of the fuzzy set theory,
we define their union and intersection by
M ∪ L = (max(τM (1), τL(1)), . . . ,max(τM (n), τL(n))) ,
M ∩ L = (min(τM (1), τL(1)), . . . ,min(τM (n), τL(n))) .
The fuzziness of coalitions leads to some difficulties if we are to consider their
disjointness. As a consequence, there can be some methodological problems if we
want to distinguish between superadditivity and convexity of games with fuzzy
coalitions (see (1),(2)). There exist, evidently, several possible views on this topic.
Here, we choose the following very simple one. In this section, we consider the
fuzzy coalitional game (I, w) with fuzzy coalitions and with characteristic function
w as introduced in Section 3 and constructed by means of (7).
We say that a game (I, w) with fuzzy coalitions is convex iff for any pair of
fuzzy coalitions K,L, analogously to (2),
w(M ∪ L) + w(M ∩ L) = w(M) + w(L). (10)
As the convexity does not require the disjointness of coalitions, there is no formal
difficulty with its re-formulation in the environment of fuzzy coalitions.
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Observation 4. If (I, v) is a crisp convex TU game, then the game (I, v¯) with
fuzzy coalitions is convex in the sense of (10), too.
Proof. The statement follows from Remark 2, Observation 2 and from (7). If
L is a convex combination of {KL1 , . . . ,KLm} and M is a convex combination of
{KM1 , . . . ,KMp }, with some coefficients then L∪M can be expressed as convex com-
bination of {KL1 , . . . ,KLm,KM1 ,
. . . ,KMp } characterizes L ∪ K with some coefficients. Due to the convexity of
the original crisp game the desired inequality is true. 
To define the superadditivity of games with fuzzy coalitions, we first say that
two fuzzy coalitions M, L are disjoint iff for all i ∈ I,min(τM (i), τL(i)) = 0. Then
we say that a TU game (I, w) with fuzzy coalitions is superadditive iff for any pair
of disjoint fuzzy coalitions K,L
w(M ∪ L) = w(M) + w(L). (11)
The following statements are obvious.
Remark 1. If a TU game with fuzzy coalitions is convex then it is superadditive.
Observation 5. If (I, v) is a superadditive crisp TU game, then (I, v¯) is super-
additive in the sense of (11).
Proof. The validity of this observation immediately follows from Remark 1, Obser-
vation 3 and from (10) and (11). 
The concept of superadditivity (and, in some sense, also convexity) presented
in the previous section does not appear to be very satisfactory. The source of
dissatisfaction can be found in the condition of disjointness, formulated above.
The disjointness of fuzzy coalitions formulated by the condition
min (τM (i), τL(i)) = 0 for all i ∈ I
exactly copies the analogous concept in the deterministic game theory, and also its
properties (see proof of Observation 4, Observation 5 and Remark 1) are sufficiently
similar to the ones known in the deterministic theory. Nevertheless, its extreme
form may be considered for too dogmatic in the case of the “weak” participation of
players in fuzzy coalitions. Let us consider a modified concept of disjointness and
check its basic properties. We say that fuzzy coalitions L, M are weakly disjoint
if, for each i ∈ I,
τL(i) + τM (i) 5 1.
Remark 2. It is easy to see that any pair of disjoint fuzzy coalitions is also
weakly disjoint, and that two crisp coalitions K, K ′ are weakly disjoint iff they are
disjoint.
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If we are to formulate the definition of superadditivity for weakly disjoint coali-
tions instead of the usual disjointness considered earlier in this section then we say
that the fuzzy game (I, w) is strongly superadditive iff w(L ∪M) = w(L) + w(M)
for each pair of weakly disjoint coalitions L and M .
Remark 3. Obviously, any strongly superadditive fuzzy game is superadditive in
the above sense, and for disjoint crisp coalitions K, K ′, w(K∪K ′) = w(K)+w(K ′)
turns into (1) as follows from Observation 3.
Unfortunately, the implication between the convexity and superadditivity which
we know from the deterministic case and also from Remark 1 is not generally
guaranteed for the strong superadditivity, as shown in the next example.
Example 2. Let us consider 3-players coalitional game (I, v), I = {1, 2, 3},
v(∅) = 0, v({1}) = v({2}) = v({3}) = 1,
v({1, 2}) = v({1, 3}) = v({2, 3}) = 2, v(I) = 3.
This game is convex and superadditive in the deterministic sense, and, therefore, by
Observation 4, the corresponding v¯ is also convex. Let us consider fuzzy coalitions
in this game, and let us construct their characteristic function v¯ by means of (7).
Let L, M be fuzzy coalitions, such that
τM (1) = 1, τM (2) =
1
2
, τM (3) = 0, τL(1) = 0, τL(2) =
1
2
, τL(3) = 1.
We can see that coalitions M and L are weakly disjoint, and that
τL∪M (1) = τL∪M (3) = 1, τL∪M (2) =
1
2
, τL∩M (1) = τL∩M (3) = 0, τL∩M (2) =
1
2
.
Furthermore, coalitionsM,L,M∪L,M∩L can be expressed as convex combinations
of crisp coalitions
M =
1
2
{1, 2}+ 1
2
{1}, L = 1
2
{2, 3}+ 1
2
{3}
L ∪M = 1
2
I +
1
2
{1, 3}, L ∩M = 1
2
{2}+ 1
2
∅.
Then it is possible to verify that, according to (7),
v¯(M) =
3
2
, v¯(L) =
3
2
, v¯(L ∪M) = 5
2
, v¯(L ∩M) = 1
2
,
which means that
v¯(L ∪M) < v¯(M) + v¯(L)
where M and L are weakly disjoint. Thus the convex game v¯ is not strongly
superadditive.
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5 Coalitional Structures
The concept which can be especially significant for further treatment of TU games
with fuzzy coalitions, namely for the definition of their core, is the concept of
coalitional structure. In our model, the coalitional structure is defined as any class
of fuzzy coalitions L = {L1, L2, . . . , Lm} such that, for all players i ∈ I,
τL1(i) + τL2(i) + · · ·+ τLm(i) = 1. (12)
It is easy to verify the validity of the following statements.
Remark 4. If the coalitions L1, L2, . . . , Lm in the above definition are crisp then
they form a coalitional structure in the deterministic sense of Section 2.
Observation 6. If a TU crisp game (I, v) is such that (I, v¯) is superadditive in
the sense of (11) and L = {L1, L2, . . . , Lm} is a coalitional structure, then
v¯(I) = v¯(L1) + v¯(L2) + · · ·+ v¯(Lm).
Proof. Each fuzzy coalition Lj from the structure L can be represented by some
class of crisp coalitions K(j)1 , . . . ,K
(j)
pj with coefficients λ
(j)
1 , . . . , λ
(j)
pj . From Ob-
servation 2, we obtain v¯(K(j)k ) = v(K
(j)
k ). Due to the finiteness of I , we may
substitute the supremum in (7) by maximum, and we may assume, without loss of
generality, that K(j)1 , . . . ,K
(j)
pj is the very crisp representation of Lj for which also
v¯(Lj) = λ
(j)
1 v(K
(j)
1 ) + · · ·+ λ(j)pj v(K(j)pj ). It follows that for every player i
τj(i) = λ
(j)
1 τK(j)1
(i) + · · ·+ λ(j)pj τK(j)pj (i)
and the definitoric property (12) implies
m∑
j=1
(
λ
(j)
1 τK(j)1
(i) + · · ·+ λ(j)pj τK(j)pj (i)
)
= 1.
Then the superadditivity of (I, v¯) implies.
v¯(I) = v(I) =
m∑
j=1
pj∑
k=1
λ
(j)
k
(
v(K(j)k )
)
=
m∑
j=1
v¯(Lj). (13)

Remark 5. Observations 4 and 5 imply the validity of (13) even if (I, v) is
superadditive.
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6 Monotonicity of Payoffs
Dealing with the topic of the fuzzy coalitions and their forming, it can be useful to
mention, at least briefly, the fundamental approach to the fuzzy coalitional pay-offs
represented by the characteristic function. In this section, we consider a coalitional
game (I, w) with fuzzy coalitions, and with characteristic function w assigning to
each fuzzy coalition K its (crisp) pay-off w(K). Some of those fuzzy coalitions are
crisp, as mentioned in Section 3, and then there may (but need not) exist some
relation between crisp and fuzzy coalitions, like (7).
In the previous sections, when dealing with the concepts of superadditivity and
convexity, we have respected the classical paradigm of additivity of pay-offs. In the
case of deterministic coalitions, it is very natural, and also for the fuzzy coalitions it
does not cause immediate problems, as we could see in Section 4. However, certain
irregularities in the relation between convexity and superadditivity (cf. Example
2) evoke the question, whether the additivity paradigm is adequate to the vague
character of cooperation in fuzzy coalitions. Some applications of fuzzy set theory
were based on an alternative paradigm, namely on the monotonicity principle. Let
us test, at least very briefly, the behaviour of superadditivity and convexity based
on the monotonous characteristic function.
We suppose that our game (I, w) with fuzzy coalitions fulfils the following two
properties for any fuzzy coalitions L, M :
w(∅) = 0, (14)
where ∅ is the empty (crisp) coalition (τ∅(i) = 0 for all i ∈ I),
if M ⊃ L then w(M) ≥ w(L)
where M ⊃ L means that τM (i) ≥ τL(i) for all i ∈ I.
(15)
In such game, we may define the modified concepts of superadditivity and
convexity as follows.
We say that (I, w) is m-convex iff for each pair of fuzzy coalitions L, M ,
max [w(L ∪M), w(L ∩M)] = max [w(M), w(L)] , (16)
where L ∪M and L ∩M are defined in Section 4.
We say that (I, w) is m-superadditive iff for any pair of weakly disjoint coalitions
L, M (see Section 4),
w(L ∪M) = max[w(M), w(L)]. (17)
The monotonicity condition (15), however natural it is (each fuzzy coalition
can earn at least as much as any smaller group of its members), appears to be too
strong regarding convexity and superaditivity.
Observation 7. Each game with fuzzy coalitions fulfilling (14) and (15) is m-
superadditive and m-convex.
Proof. Due to (15), w(L ∪M) = w(L ∩M), w(L ∪M) = w(M) and w(L ∪M) =
w(L). These inequalities immediately prove the statement. 
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Remark 6. Evidently, if a game (I, w) with fuzzy coalitions fulfils (15) then
w(I) = w(L) = 0 for crisp I and any fuzzy coalition L.
The above remark opens interesting possibilities for the eventual development
of the core-like solution concept in games modeled on the monotonicity principle.
7 Concluding Remarks
The limited extend of this contribution admits to mention only the main ideas
regarding the fuzziness of coalitional cooperation. Even this brief presentation of
the topic shows that many other problems related to this concept become urgent.
For example:
— The algorithm for computation of coefficients mentioned in the proof of Ob-
servation 3 and implicitly assumed in Remark 4 or in the proof of Observation
5.
— The method of quantitative measurement of “distance” between fuzzy coali-
tions.
— More advanced analysis of the superadditivity and convexity.
The solution of these problems may open the way to the natural transformation
of the presented model of fuzzy coalitions to the fuzzy classes of crisp TU games,
analogously to the fuzzification of payoffs suggested in [7].
It seems that the model of cooperation in fuzzy coalitions based on the paradigm
of monotonicity deserves more attention for its respect to the specific features of
vague structures of coalitions.
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